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 II.-84 
REPLY ‘STOP’ TO CANCEL: WHETHER 
RECEIVING ONE UNWANTED MARKETING 
TEXT MESSAGE CONFERS STANDING IN 
FEDERAL COURT 
Abstract: On August 28, 2019, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh 
Circuit, in Salcedo v. Hanna, created a split regarding whether the receipt of a text 
message in violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991 (TCPA) 
confers standing to sue. The TCPA contains prohibitions on the use of telephonic 
equipment for telemarketing purposes, which the Federal Communications Com-
mission (FCC) has interpreted to include text messaging. The Act also provides a 
private right of action for citizens to sue for violations if they have standing, mean-
ing, in part, that they have suffered an injury. In Salcedo, the Eleventh Circuit held 
that the recipient of a single text message sent in violation of the TCPA did not suf-
fer an injury and, thus, could not establish standing to sue. This Comment argues 
that, based on precedent from the Supreme Court of the United States, the Eleventh 
Circuit correctly concluded that the plaintiff did not have standing. It further argues, 
however, that the Eleventh Circuit erred in ruling that Congress did not intend for 
the TCPA prohibitions to apply to text messages. 
INTRODUCTION 
Ninety-six percent of Americans owned a cellular phone in 2019, making 
cell phones essentially ubiquitous in the United States.1 Texting is a highly preva-
lent form of communication in the modern world.2 Some businesses, however, 
                                                                                                                           
 1 Mobile Fact Sheet, PEW RSCH. CTR.: INTERNET & TECH. (June 12, 2019), https://www.pew
research.org/internet/fact-sheet/mobile/ [https://perma.cc/ZQG5-UGM8]. Hand-held cell phones have 
existed for less than fifty years, as the first ever call from a cell phone occurred in 1973. Charlee 
Dyroff, Here’s How Much Cellphones Have Actually Changed Over the Years, INSIDER (July 25, 
2018), https://www.insider.com/the-history-of-the-cellphone-2018-7 [https://perma.cc/G9L3-9SAL]. 
Cell phones were not commercially available until a decade later in 1983. Id. IBM created the first 
smartphone, which had a touchscreen and included email and fax capabilities, in 1992. Steven Tweed-
ie, The World’s First Smartphone, Simon, Was Created 15 Years Before the iPhone, BUS. INSIDER 
(June 14, 2015), https://www.businessinsider.com/worlds-first-smartphone-simon-launched-before-
iphone-2015-6 [https://perma.cc/8BJQ-5Z5D]. Americans looked at their cellular devices an average 
of ninety-six times each day in 2019. Americans Check Their Phones 96 Times a Day, ASURION (Nov. 
21, 2019), https://www.asurion.com/about/press-releases/americans-check-their-phones-96-times-a-
day/ [https://perma.cc/JZL2-R2Z8]. 
 2 See Total Number of Text Messages Sent in the United States from 2005 to 2019, STATISTA 
(Sept. 2, 2020), https://www.statista.com/statistics/185879/number-of-text-messages-in-the-united-
states-since-2005/ [https://perma.cc/ZA2S-H8HX] (graphing fifteen years of text message data in the 
United States). Text messaging was first possible in 1992, and, by 2007, American cell phone users 
were sending more text messages than they were making actual phone calls. Christine Erickson, A 
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use this modern and efficient technology for generally disfavored telemarketing 
purposes.3 
In 1991, Congress enacted the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991 
(TCPA) to protect consumers and businesses from the burden associated with 
telemarketer solicitation.4 The Federal Communications Commission (FCC), us-
ing the authority granted to it in the TCPA, later extended that protection to the 
realm of telemarketing text messaging.5 Moreover, the TCPA grants citizens a 
private right of action to sue telemarketers for violations of the TCPA.6 To bring 
suit in federal court, however, a citizen must have standing under Article III of the 
United States Constitution.7 One of the elements of standing is that the plaintiff 
must have suffered a concrete injury in fact.8 Multiple federal appeals courts have 
addressed whether a recipient of unsolicited telemarketing text messages meets 
the injury in fact requirement.9 
                                                                                                                           
Brief History of Text Messaging, MASHABLE (Sept. 21, 2012), https://mashable.com/2012/09/21/text-
messaging-history/ [https://perma.cc/9W27-GQZV]. Wireless phone users in the United States sent 
over two trillion text messages in 2019 alone. Total Number of Text Messages Sent in the United 
States from 2005 to 2019, supra. 
 3 See, e.g., Melito v. Experian Mktg. Sols., Inc., 923 F.3d 85, 88 (2d Cir.) (involving a class action 
lawsuit against a business for sending unwanted telemarketing text messages to the plaintiffs), cert. de-
nied, 140 S. Ct. 677 (2019). The U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics estimated that 134,800 people were 
working as telemarketers in May 2018, with an estimated 77,300 of them supporting business sales. 
Occupational Employment and Wages, May 2019: 41-9041 Telemarketers, BUREAU OF LAB. STAT. (July 
6, 2020), https://www.bls.gov/oes/current/oes419041.htm# [https://perma.cc/ZT3Z-V32Q]; see Telemar-
keting, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/telemarketing [https://
perma.cc/88PH-SXAD] (defining “telemarketing” as the promotion and sale of commodities or labor 
over the phone). 
 4 See Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) of 1991, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b) (placing re-
strictions on the use of telephone equipment for telemarketing purposes, with an emphasis on auto-
mated telephone equipment). 
 5 See id. § 227(b)(2) (conferring control to the FCC to regulate and implement the prohibitions 
listed in § 227(b) concerning the use of automated telephone equipment); Rules & Regulations Im-
plementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 18 FCC Rcd. 14,014, 14,115 (2003) 
[hereinafter 2003 Order] (interpreting the TCPA prohibitions on telemarketing calls to include both 
calls and text messages sent to cell phones). 
 6 See 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3) (allowing citizens to bring an action to enjoin a violation, recoup 
monetary damages for a violation, or both); Enjoin, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (de-
fining “enjoin” as stopping an action). 
 7 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (extending federal court jurisdiction to “Cases” and “Controver-
sies”); Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016) (stating that the doctrine of standing 
stems from Article III of the U.S. Constitution and that courts consistently reinforce the doctrine). 
 8 Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1547, 1548; see Injury, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 6 (defin-
ing “injury in fact” as a definite or impending violation of one’s legal right that gives standing to the 
injured party to sue). Additionally, the injury must stem from the defendant’s actions. Spokeo, 136 S. 
Ct. at 1547. Finally, a beneficial legal judgment must be “likely” to rectify the injury. Id. The Court 
noted that the plaintiff has the burden of proving each of these requirements. Id. 
 9 See Gadelhak v. AT&T Servs., 950 F.3d 458, 463 (7th Cir. 2020) (answering whether receipt of 
telemarketing text messages is a concrete injury in fact); Salcedo v. Hanna, 936 F.3d 1162, 1165 (11th 
Cir. 2019) (same); Melito v. Experian Mktg. Sols., Inc., 923 F.3d 85, 88 (2d Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 
II.-86 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 62:E. Supp. 
This Comment examines the circuit split resulting from the disagreement 
over whether recipients of unwanted telemarketing text messages have standing 
to sue in federal court.10 Part I of this Comment gives an overview of the relevant 
legal history of the TCPA, the doctrine of standing, and the procedural history of 
Salcedo v. Hanna.11 Part II discusses the Salcedo court’s reasoning and outcome 
on the issue of standing as compared to that of the United States Courts of Ap-
peals for the Second, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits.12 Finally, Part III argues that 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reached the correct 
conclusion in Salcedo but should have altered its approach significantly in as-
sessing congressional intent when addressing the issue of standing.13 
I. STANDING TO SUE: THE TCPA AND TEXT MESSAGING 
In 2019, in Salcedo v. Hanna, the Eleventh Circuit decided that a class rep-
resentative who received a single unsolicited telemarketing text message had not 
suffered an injury in fact.14 The court concluded that any alleged injury suffered 
from a single text message, even if in violation of the TCPA, was not concrete 
enough to allow the plaintiff class to proceed with its suit against the senders of 
the message.15 Section A of this Part explains the TCPA as it relates to automated 
text messaging.16 Section B describes the doctrine of standing and how other cir-
cuit courts have applied it to the issue of telemarketing text messages before the 
Eleventh Circuit.17 Section C lays out the procedural history of Salcedo leading 
up to the Eleventh Circuit’s decision.18 
                                                                                                                           
140 S. Ct. 677 (2019); Van Patten v. Vertical Fitness Grp., LLC, 847 F.3d 1037, 1042 (9th Cir. 2017) 
(same). 
 10 See infra notes 14–107 and accompanying text. 
 11 See infra notes 14–53 and accompanying text. 
 12 See infra notes 54–81 and accompanying text. 
 13 See infra notes 82–107 and accompanying text. 
 14 Salcedo v. Hanna, 936 F.3d 1162, 1165 (11th Cir. 2019); see Representative, BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY, supra note 6 (defining a “class representative” as a person who appears in the place of 
the plaintiffs during a class action lawsuit); see also supra note 8 and accompanying text (explaining 
standing requirements). Because the plaintiffs had not suffered an injury in fact, the Eleventh Circuit 
ruled that the plaintiff lacked standing to sue for monetary damages in federal court. Salcedo, 936 
F.3d at 1165. 
 15 Salcedo, 936 F.3d at 1166, 1173; see infra note 31 and accompanying text (defining what 
makes an injury “concrete”). 
 16 See infra notes 19–26 and accompanying text. 
 17 See infra notes 27–44 and accompanying text. 
 18 See infra notes 45–53 and accompanying text. 
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A. Congress and the FCC Ban Automated Calls and Texts 
Congress passed the TCPA in 1991, imposing prohibitions on the use of au-
tomated telephonic equipment for telemarketing purposes.19 As the basis of this 
legislation, Congress relied on a series of statistics and findings that focused 
largely on the negative impact of telemarketing on American consumers.20 Find-
ing no alternatives, Congress enacted the TCPA to prevent the use of telephonic 
equipment for unwanted solicitation practices, with specific exceptions.21 When 
violations occur, the TCPA provides for a private right of action that allows indi-
viduals to seek an injunction or recover damages.22 
                                                                                                                           
 19 Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) of 1991, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1); Telephone Con-
sumer Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-243, § 2(5), 105 Stat. 2394, 2394 (1991); see 47 
U.S.C. § 227(a)(1) (defining “automatic telephone dialing system” as any device capable of holding 
and unsystematically or serially generating and dialing phone numbers); supra note 3 and accompany-
ing text (describing “telemarketing” as conducting sales over the phone). These prohibitions apply to 
persons both inside and outside the United States engaging in unsolicited telemarketing on the behalf 
of a business by contacting other businesses and individuals located in the United States. See 47 
U.S.C. § 227(b)(1) (extending liability both inside and outside the United States). The TCPA lists 
exceptions to the prohibition on automated equipment allowing calls made for emergencies or with the 
recipient’s prior explicit permission. Id. § 227(b)(1)(A). The Act also grants the FCC discretion to 
create additional exceptions. Id. § 227(b)(2)(B). Congress later created an exception for government 
debt collection calls. See Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-74, § 301(a), 129 Stat. 584, 
588 (adding a provision permitting automated calling for the limited purpose of collecting outstanding 
debts to the federal government). But see Barr v. Am. Ass’n of Pol. Consultants, Inc., 140 S. Ct. 2335, 
2356 (2020) (invalidating the debt-collection exception as unconstitutional). 
 20 See § 2, 105 Stat. at 2394–95 (listing Congress’s findings about the prevalence of automated 
telemarketing schemes in the United States and the negative effects they have on consumers and other 
businesses and also suggesting the best course of action to counteract those effects). At the time of 
Congress’s findings, over eighteen million Americans received telemarketing calls each day from over 
three hundred thousand solicitors on behalf of more than thirty thousand businesses. Id. § 2(2)–(3), 
105 Stat. at 2394−95; see Solicitor, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 6 (defining “solicitor” as 
a person who requests work or money from other people). Congress repeatedly referred to these calls 
as “intrusive” and a “nuisance” to consumers. See § 2(5)–(6), (10), (14), 105 Stat. at 2394 (discussing 
how the calls interfered with privacy, emergencies, and business). Congress also noted business griev-
ances over interferences with commerce and stated that enacting restrictions on unsolicited telemar-
keting schemes would not violate the U.S. Constitution. Id. § 2(8), (14), 105 Stat. at 2394−95. 
 21 See § 2(12), 105 Stat. at 2394−95 (finding that banning telemarketing calls to the home, except 
in situations of consent or emergency, was the only method to guard consumers from the “nuisance 
and invasion of privacy” that accompany those calls); see also Nuisance, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, 
supra note 6 (defining “nuisance” as an action or circumstance that interferes with one’s ability to use 
or benefit from property); Invasion of Privacy, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 6 (defining 
“invasion of privacy” as an indefensible use of a person’s character or violation of a person’s private 
happenings). Congress also noted that technologies capable of blocking automated calls are costly and 
not widely available to consumers. § 2(11), 105 Stat. at 2394. 
 22 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3); see Injunction, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 6 (defining 
“injunction” as a judicial mandate forcing or stopping an activity). The TCPA does, however, state 
that the court rules and laws of the state in which the action is brought must separately permit a pri-
vate action brought under this section. Id. § 227(b)(3). The TCPA allows recovery for the greater 
amount of actual monetary loss or $500 per violation. Id. § 227(b)(3)(B). 
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Additionally, the TCPA provides considerable power and deference to the 
FCC to implement and regulate the Act’s prohibitions.23 These prohibitions focus 
on calls and advertisements sent to fax machines.24 Because texting did not exist 
at the time Congress drafted and passed the TCPA, Congress did not incorporate 
mobile phone text messages.25 Almost twelve years after the TCPA’s passage, 
however, the FCC used its discretionary power to interpret text messages as 
phone calls for purposes of prohibited telemarketing.26 
B. Only the Injured May Sue 
The United States Constitution limits federal courts’ power to overseeing 
“Cases” and “Controversies.”27 The Constitution does not define those terms, but, 
in 2016, in Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, the Supreme Court of the United States stated 
that standing is an essential requirement of a judicial case or controversy.28 As 
                                                                                                                           
 23 See id. § 227(b)(2), (c) (providing guidelines and rules for the FCC to use in implementing 
regulations to enforce the prohibitions and protect the privacy rights of residential telephone subscrib-
ers); see also § 2(15), 105 Stat. at 2395 (suggesting that the FCC contemplate creating limitations on 
“automated or prerecorded calls” to consumers in line with free speech protections). 
 24 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1). The statute defines “telephone facsimile machine” as any machine ca-
pable of either sending words or pictures that it transcribed from paper over a phone line or receiving 
signals over a phone line and transmitting them into words or pictures on paper. Id. § 227(a)(3). 
 25 See generally id. § 227 (making no mention of text messages). Congress passed the TCPA in 
1991, but the very first text message was not sent until December of 1992. Heather Kelly, OMG, the 
Text Message Turns 20. But Has SMS Peaked?, CNN (Dec. 3, 2012), https://www.cnn.com/2012/12/
03/tech/mobile/sms-text-message-20/index.html [https://perma.cc/B632-FUNY]; see also 105 Stat. at 
2402 (noting the approval date of the TCPA as December 20, 1991). 
 26 See 2003 Order, 18 FCC Rcd. at 14,115 (ordering that the TCPA’s ban on telemarketing calls to 
wireless phones extends to voice and text calls); see also Rules & Regulations Implementing the Tele-
phone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 30 FCC Rcd. 7961, 7965 (2015) [hereinafter 2015 Order] (stat-
ing that “[t]ext messages are ‘calls’” under the TCPA based on prior FCC determination). The FCC has 
noted that the TCPA prohibitions on calls and text messages can extend to texts or calls made using 
phone applications, or “apps.” See 2015 Order, 30 FCC Rcd. at 7978–80 (discussing whether liability 
extends to app developers when people use their apps to send calls and texts in violation of the TCPA); 
see also Mobile Application (Mobile App), TECHNOPEDIA, https://www.techopedia.com/definition/
2953/mobile-application-mobile-app [https://perma.cc/T6BT-ENQB] (defining “mobile application” 
as any software created for use on a cell phone). 
 27 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
 28 Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016) (noting that the doctrine of standing is a 
long-established element of a justiciable case); see also Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 
(1992) (holding that standing is an immutable and vital requirement of an Article III case or contro-
versy); Standing, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 6 (defining “standing” as the ability to 
either bring forth a legal assertion or request that a court compel an obligation or privilege, with that 
ability belonging only to those who show real harm to a legally-assured right). The Court has devel-
oped three required elements for a plaintiff to have standing: that the plaintiff (1) suffered an injury in 
fact (2) relatively connected to the defendant’s actions that (3) a successful judicial outcome can rem-
edy. Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1547 (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560–61); see also Friends of the Earth, Inc. 
v. Laidlaw Env’t Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180–81 (2000) (same). 
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emphasized in Spokeo, Congress has no power to nullify or supersede the stand-
ing requirement because it is based in the Constitution.29 
To have standing, an injury in fact must be both “concrete and particular-
ized.”30 In Spokeo, the Court emphasized that “concrete” and “particularized” are 
distinct, defining “concrete” as actual and existing, though not necessarily percep-
tible.31 The Court focused on the concreteness requirement and held that Con-
gress’s judgment is valuable in determining whether an alleged intangible harm 
meets the necessary injury in fact threshold.32 The Court further ruled that the 
existence of a relationship between the intangible harm and a harm that English 
and American common law historically recognized is also relevant and informa-
tive when assessing standing.33 
Following the Supreme Court’s Spokeo decision, multiple federal circuit 
courts have applied the framework to alleged violations of the TCPA.34 In 2017, 
in Van Patten v. Vertical Fitness Group, LLC, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit was the first circuit to address whether receipt of text messages that 
violated the TCPA constituted an injury in fact.35 The Ninth Circuit cited congres-
                                                                                                                           
 29 Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1547–48. The Court explained that Article III of the Constitution requires 
a showing of real harm, and Congress may never eliminate that requirement through statutory man-
date. Id. (quoting Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 820 n.3 (1997)). The Supreme Court noted in Raines 
v. Byrd, in 1997, that this restriction on congressional authority is based in the doctrine of separation 
of powers. See 521 U.S. at 820 (noting that, constitutionally, a determination of whether a party has 
standing to sue falls under the purview of the judicial branch). 
 30 Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1548 (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560). An injury must also be real or 
impending rather than merely speculative. Id. 
 31 Id. at 1548, 1549. The Court defined “particularized” as distinctively impacting the plaintiff. Id. 
at 1548. 
 32 Id. at 1549. The Court, in Spokeo, referred to statutes to delineate congressional judgment. See 
id. (describing congressional identification of intangible harms in statutes). Applying the distinction 
between particularization and concreteness to the case at hand, the Court vacated the Ninth Circuit’s 
decision and remanded it because the circuit court only addressed particularized harm. Id. at 1550. 
 33 Id. at 1549. In his concurring opinion, Justice Thomas stated that, in common law, courts have 
had broader jurisdiction over cases involving violations of individual rights than public rights. Id. at 
1551 (Thomas, J., concurring); see Right, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 6 (defining “private 
right” as belonging to an individual and “public right” as one belonging to everyone that a govern-
ment office typically oversees). Justice Thomas stated that the plaintiff lacked standing to sue for the 
defendant’s violation of public rights. Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1553 (Thomas, J., concurring). Because 
the plaintiff also claimed a violation of a private right, however, Justice Thomas agreed with the ma-
jority that remand was appropriate to allow the Ninth Circuit to properly reassess the plaintiff’s al-
leged private injury. Id. at 1553–54. 
 34 See, e.g., Salcedo v. Hanna, 936 F.3d 1162, 1167, 1169–72 (11th Cir. 2019) (discussing the 
Spokeo holding and applying it to alleged violations of telemarketing prohibitions in the TCPA); Van 
Patten v. Vertical Fitness Grp., LLC, 847 F.3d 1037, 1042–43 (9th Cir. 2017) (same). 
 35 See Van Patten, 847 F.3d at 1043 (discussing whether the plaintiff had standing to sue for the 
alleged TCPA violation); see also Case, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 6 (defining “case of 
first impression” as a case with a legal question not previously answered by an authoritative legal 
source in that court’s jurisdiction). In Van Patten, the named plaintiff had provided his cell phone 
number on a gym application form. 847 F.3d at 1041. The gym sent him two telemarketing texts after 
the plaintiff had cancelled his membership, causing him to sue the gym. Id. at 1041–42. 
II.-90 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 62:E. Supp. 
sional intent and reasoned that the receipt of two text messages was a concrete 
injury to the plaintiff’s privacy.36 Then, in 2019, in Melito v. Experian Marketing 
Solutions, Inc., the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit followed the 
Ninth Circuit’s holding that receipt of unwanted telemarketing text messages con-
stitutes a concrete injury.37 The Second Circuit reasoned that although text mes-
sages were not the same as phone calls or faxes, they nonetheless exhibited the 
same harm that Congress intended the TCPA to prevent.38 Continuing with the 
Spokeo framework, the Second Circuit shifted its analysis to traditional bases for 
lawsuits in English and American courts.39 The Second Circuit agreed with the 
Ninth Circuit that the receipt of unwanted text messages matched long-
established injuries of nuisance, invasion of privacy, and intrusion upon seclu-
sion.40 Concluding that the plaintiff successfully met the Spokeo standard, the 
Second Circuit held that the recipient of several unwanted text messages did not 
need to show further injury.41 
In 2020, after the Eleventh Circuit’s Salcedo decision, the Seventh Circuit, 
in Gadelhak v. AT&T Services, Inc., followed both the Second and Ninth Circuits, 
ruling that the recipient of five unwanted text messages had standing to sue.42 The 
                                                                                                                           
 36 Van Patten, 847 F.3d at 1043. The Ninth Circuit ruled that unsolicited telemarking calls and 
texts infringe upon the recipient’s privacy. Id. (citing Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549). Therefore, accord-
ing to the Ninth Circuit, a person suing under the TCPA need only show violation of that law and not 
any additional injury. Id. Contra Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549 (stating that only “in some circumstances” 
involving procedural violations, a plaintiff does not need to allege any additional harm other than the 
one Congress recognized (emphasis added)). In Van Patten, the Ninth Circuit nonetheless affirmed the 
lower court’s decision to grant summary judgment to the defendants based on other grounds. 847 F.3d 
at 1048. Specifically, the court ruled that the plaintiff had failed to revoke consent to receive texts 
from the defendant. Id. 
 37 See Melito v. Experian Mktg. Sols., Inc., 923 F.3d 85, 93 (2d Cir.) (holding that receiving un-
solicited telemarketing text messages gave plaintiffs standing to sue), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 677 
(2019). The Second Circuit did not state how many unwanted text messages were sent, only referring 
to them in the plural. See id. at 89 (referring to the alleged violation as receipt of “spam text messag-
es”). 
 38 Id. at 93. The Second Circuit did not explain how texts differ from calls or faxes but still pro-
duce the same injury. See id. (stating only that texts are “different in some respects” from calls and 
faxes). 
 39 Id. (citing Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549). 
 40 Id. (citing Van Patten, 847 F.3d at 1043); see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652 (AM. 
L. INST. 1977) (defining “intrusion upon seclusion” as a purposeful and extremely displeasing inva-
sion of another’s body or personal matters); see also supra note 21 (discussing “nuisance” and “inva-
sion of privacy”). The Second Circuit also mentioned and cited a U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third 
Circuit decision concerning standing to sue under the TCPA. Melito, 923 F.3d at 93 (citing Susinno v. 
Work Out World Inc., 862 F.3d 346, 351–52 (3d Cir. 2017)). That case, however, involved a single 
prerecorded phone call to a cellular phone rather than a text message. See Susinno, 862 F.3d at 348 
(noting that the plaintiff received a prerecorded voicemail after not answering the initial telemarketing 
call to her cell phone). 
 41 See Melito, 923 F.3d at 93 (holding that the plaintiff sufficiently showed concrete injury from 
the receipt of unwanted text messages (citing Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549)). 
 42 Gadelhak v. AT&T Servs., Inc., 950 F.3d 458, 460, 463 (7th Cir. 2020). The defendant did not 
argue that the plaintiffs lacked standing, but the court addressed the issue sua sponte. Id. at 461; see 
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Seventh Circuit decided that the alleged harm related to the traditional claim of 
intrusion upon seclusion.43 Paralleling the Second and Ninth Circuits, the Seventh 
Circuit ruled that Congress intended to prevent the harm that unwanted texts 
cause, thus conferring standing on the plaintiff.44 
C. The Salcedo District Court’s Request for Guidance  
from the Eleventh Circuit 
The Salcedo class action lawsuit commenced as a result of the defendant 
and his law firm allegedly sending unsolicited text messages to the plaintiffs over 
the previous four years.45 The plaintiffs requested five hundred dollars in statuto-
ry damages per message and an additional fifteen hundred dollars in treble dam-
ages for texts transmitted willfully or knowingly in violation of the TCPA.46 The 
plaintiff claimed that his concrete injuries in fact included wasted time, invasion 
of his right to privacy, and invasion of his right to use his cell phone unhin-
dered.47 
The Salcedo defendants sought dismissal of the case, arguing, in part, a lack 
of standing.48 The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida 
first denied the defendants’ motion for dismissal, leading the defendants to re-
                                                                                                                           
Sua Sponte, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 6 (defining “sua sponte” as unaccompanied by 
any inducement or proposal). 
 43 Gadelhak, 950 F.3d at 462. The Seventh Circuit interpreted the Spokeo decision to require that 
the alleged harm be related “in kind, not degree,” to a traditional claim. Id. As such, the Seventh Cir-
cuit did not find it necessary to consider whether the harm of receiving multiple unwanted text mes-
sages was as severe as the harm that intrusion upon seclusion historically caused. See id. at 463 (dis-
regarding the relative triviality of receiving text messages in comparison to common law harms be-
cause Congress elected to make receipt of text messages a concrete injury). The court also held that 
the number of unwanted text messages that a plaintiff receives is irrelevant. Id. at 463 n.2. 
 44 Id. at 462–63. 
 45 Salcedo v. Hanna, 936 F.3d 1162, 1165 (11th Cir. 2019). The class representative, John 
Salcedo, received a single text message offering a 10% price reduction for legal services. Id. Salcedo 
was a past client of the defendants, lawyer Alex Hanna and his Florida firm. Id. 
 46 Id.; see 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3) (granting the court discretion to award three times the actual 
damages in the case of willful or knowing violation of the prohibitions in § 227(b)); see also Damag-
es, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 6 (defining “treble damages” as statutory damages 
amounting to triple the real damages owed to a party). 
 47 Salcedo, 936 F.3d at 1167. The plaintiff analogized his situation to that in Palm Beach Golf 
Center-Boca, Inc. v. John G. Sarris, D.D.S., P.A., a 2015 case in which the Eleventh Circuit recog-
nized receipt of an unwanted one-page fax as an injury meeting the standing requirement. Id. at 1167–
68 (citing Palm Beach Golf Ctr.-Boca, Inc. v. John G. Sarris, D.D.S., P.A., 781 F.3d 1245, 1252 (11th 
Cir. 2015)). In Palm Beach Golf, the defendant sent a fax advertising dental services to the plaintiff. 
781 F.3d at 1248–49. The Eleventh Circuit ruled that the plaintiff suffered an injury for standing pur-
poses because the defendant occupied the plaintiff’s fax machine, thus making the plaintiff’s property 
unusable while receiving and printing the advertisement. Id. at 1252 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 102-317, at 
10 (1991)). 
 48 Salcedo, 936 F.3d at 1165. The individual defendant, Hanna, also argued that the complaint did 
not present a proper claim regarding him and that the court should eliminate portions of the complaint 
concerning him. Id. 
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quest that the court reconsider its decision or allow for an interlocutory appeal.49 
Finding the Eleventh Circuit’s ruling in 2015, in Palm Beach Golf Center-Boca, 
Inc. v. John G. Sarris, D.D.S., P.A., binding, the district court ruled that the plain-
tiff had standing to sue.50 The court questioned, however, if Palm Beach Golf was 
still applicable to the Salcedo case.51 The court found that the unresolved standing 
question was central to the case. 52 To resolve the question, the district court or-
dered an interlocutory appeal to the Eleventh Circuit.53 
II. THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT CREATES A SPLIT ON THE ISSUE OF  
STANDING TO SUE FOR UNWANTED TEXT MESSAGES 
Similar to the United States Courts of Appeals for the Second, Seventh, and 
Ninth Circuits, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit relied 
upon the guidelines for establishing federal standing that the Supreme Court of 
the United States laid out in 2016, in Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins.54 The Eleventh Cir-
cuit, however, came to the opposite conclusion as the Second, Seventh, and Ninth 
Circuits.55 The Eleventh Circuit ruled that the plaintiff lacked Article III stand-
                                                                                                                           
 49 Salcedo v. Hanna, No. 16-cv-62480, 2017 WL 4226635, at *1 (S.D. Fla. June 14, 2017), rev’d, 
936 F.3d 1162 (11th Cir. 2019); see Appeal, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 6 (defining “in-
terlocutory appeal” as an appeal that transpires in the middle of the trial court case). 
 50 Salcedo, 2017 WL 4226635, at *1 (citing Palm Beach Golf, 781 F.3d at 1253). 
 51 Id.; see Palm Beach Golf, 781 F.3d at 1253 (ruling that the recipient of an unwanted fax had 
standing to sue). The district court pointed to other precedential decisions, including Spokeo, and an 
influential 2016 Eleventh Circuit opinion, Nicklaw v. Citimortgage, concerning a similar question of 
standing. Salcedo, 2017 WL 4226635, at *1 (citing Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1549 
(2016) (noting that the Palm Beach Golf decision was binding on the district court but questioning 
that ruling in light of the subsequent decisions on the Article III requirement for a concrete injury in 
fact from Spokeo and Nicklaw). 
 52 Salcedo, 2017 WL 4226635, at *1. Courts have differed on how to decide when a question is 
controlling. See 16 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PRO-
CEDURE § 3930 (3d ed. 2002) (noting different approaches taken in judicial decisions approaching 
controlling questions of law). Courts often consider a question to be controlling if its incorrect answer 
would necessitate a reversal on final judgment or, alternatively, if an interlocutory reversal would save 
time and money for the court and parties involved. Id. The Salcedo district court took the latter posi-
tion, deciding that an interlocutory appeal could potentially prevent costly future litigation centered 
around a single text message. Salcedo, 2017 WL 4226635, at *1. The district court noted that it some-
times orders an interlocutory appeal in situations that involve a determinative legal question with 
considerable basis for differing stances. Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b)).  
 53 Salcedo, 2017 WL 4226635, at *1–2. 
 54 See Gadelhak v. AT&T Servs., Inc., 950 F.3d 458, 462 (7th Cir. 2020) (applying the Spokeo 
framework to assess the concreteness of any injury that unsolicited text messaging can cause); Salcedo 
v. Hanna, 936 F.3d 1162, 1168 (11th Cir. 2019) (same); Melito v. Experian Mktg. Sols., Inc., 923 
F.3d 85, 93 (2d Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 677 (2019); Van Patten v. Vertical Fitness Grp., 
LLC, 847 F.3d 1037, 1042–43 (9th Cir. 2017) (same); see also Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 
1540, 1549 (2016) (stating the indicia courts should seek when ruling whether an intangible harm is 
concrete). 
 55 Compare Salcedo, 936 F.3d at 1172 (holding that the recipient of a telemarketing text message 
did not suffer an injury in fact and lacked standing to sue), with Gadelhak, 950 F.3d at 463 (holding 
that the recipient of unwanted telemarking text messages suffered a concrete injury in fact and there-
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ing.56 Section A of this Part discusses the Eleventh Circuit’s approach in analyz-
ing the issue of standing through the Spokeo framework.57 Section B briefly dis-
cusses the Second, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits’ differing approaches and out-
comes using the Spokeo framework.58 
A. The Eleventh Circuit Discerns No Congressional Intent or Traditional 
Harm Related to Receiving Unwanted Text Messages 
In 2019, in Salcedo v. Hanna, the Eleventh Circuit held that, at the time of 
the ruling, Congress had displayed no intent to make receipt of unsolicited text 
messages a concrete injury in fact under the TCPA.59 Notably, the FCC has in-
cluded text messages as calls that the TCPA prohibits when using automated 
equipment for telemarketing purposes.60 Yet, the Eleventh Circuit stated that it 
did not need to address whether it owed the FCC’s regulations deference because 
the Spokeo framework directed courts specifically to Congress, not federal agen-
cies.61 
Focusing only on Congress’s direct actions, the court concluded that any 
harm attendant to an unwanted telemarketing text message did not match the con-
                                                                                                                           
fore had standing in federal court), and Melito, 923 F.3d at 93 (same), and Van Patten, 847 F.3d at 
1043 (same). 
 56 Salcedo, 936 F.3d at 1172 (holding that receiving a telemarketing text message did not create 
an injury in fact and the plaintiff lacked standing to sue). 
 57 See infra notes 59–70 and accompanying text. 
 58 See infra notes 71–81 and accompanying text. 
 59 Salcedo, 936 F.3d at 1168–69. The court emphasized that Congress had not yet addressed or 
even mentioned text messages in the relevant sections of the TCPA prohibiting automated telemarket-
ing. See id. (stating that Congress had said “nothing” in the TCPA about any harms suffered when 
receiving a telemarketing text message). The court did acknowledge that the ability to send modern 
text messages was nonexistent at the time of the TCPA’s enactment. Id. at 1169. The court noted, 
however, that Congress had not subsequently included text messages in the class of statutorily regu-
lated telemarketing techniques in amendments to the TCPA. Id. 
 60 Id. at 1169; see 2003 Order, 18 FCC Rcd. at 14,115 (2003) (extending TCPA prohibitions on 
telemarketing calls to text messages). 
 61 Salcedo, 936 F.3d at 1169 & n.8 (citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 
467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984)). In 1984, in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 
Inc., the Supreme Court addressed the steps that courts should take when reviewing an authorized 
government agency’s statutory construction. 467 U.S. at 842–43. According to the Court’s decision, 
congressional intent on the matter in question is controlling when it is explicit. Id. If, on the other 
hand, the statute does not address the disputed issue, courts should examine the permissibility of the 
agency’s interpretation. Id. at 843. The Court held that agencies draft mandates out of necessity to 
supplement voids in the statute that Congress left unaddressed. Id. (citing Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 
199, 231 (1974)). The Court ruled that when Congress clearly entrusts an agency to answer those 
omissions, Congress transfers control to that agency. Id. at 843–44. The agency’s regulations are 
therefore governing unless unjustified or overtly incompatible with the statute itself. Id. at 844. Even 
in cases of unexpressed delegation, the court must follow the agency’s interpretation unless it is un-
reasonable. Id. 
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cerns that Congress cited when drafting the TCPA.62 As a consequence of Con-
gress’s silence regarding texting, the court did not create a new harm for purposes 
of the standing requirement.63 Previously, in 2015, in Palm Beach Golf Center-
Boca, Inc. v. John G. Sarris, D.D.S., P.A., the Eleventh Circuit held that receipt of 
a single unsolicited fax established standing under the TCPA.64 The Salcedo court 
distinguished text messages from faxes because, unlike faxes, text messages do 
not preoccupy the phone from performing other duties and may not cost the re-
cipient any money.65 
As the Supreme Court advised in Spokeo, the Eleventh Circuit then turned to 
legal history, examining whether the plaintiff’s alleged harm was closely related 
to any harm that traditionally conferred standing to sue in English or American 
courts.66 Beginning with the invasion of privacy allegation, the court concluded 
that the plaintiff did not suffer a considerable disturbance which the traditional 
tort of intrusion upon seclusion requires.67 Next, the court analyzed the nuisance 
argument, similarly finding no relation to the traditional trespass and private nui-
sance torts due to no infringement on the plaintiff’s real property.68 Finally, re-
garding the plaintiff’s claims of conversion and trespass to chattel, the Eleventh 
Circuit found no relation because any interference the text message caused was 
not sufficiently serious and did not result in complete control over the cell 
phone.69 Concluding that the plaintiff’s alleged harm did not meet the Spokeo 
                                                                                                                           
 62 See Salcedo, 936 F.3d at 1169 (reviewing Congress’s actions regarding the TCPA since the 
invention of text messaging); see also Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-
243, § 2(5)–(6), (10), 105 Stat. 2394, 2394 (1991) (citing telephone users’ claims of privacy invasion 
and nuisance due to automated and prerecorded telemarketing schemes). 
 63 Salcedo, 936 F.3d at 1169 (describing Congress as the political branch most suited to identify 
and address new technological advancements that may cause harm and emphasizing Congress’s si-
lence on the issue of telemarketing text messages). The Eleventh Circuit concluded that creating a new 
harm would be akin to guessing congressional intent. Id. at 1170. 
 64 Palm Beach Golf Ctr.-Boca, Inc. v. John G. Sarris, D.D.S., P.A., 781 F.3d 1245, 1252 (11th 
Cir. 2015). 
 65 Salcedo, 936 F.3d at 1168, 1170. The court noted that receiving faxes fully occupies the ma-
chine and requires paper, ink, and toner, which cost the recipient money. Id. at 1168. In comparison, 
the court pointed out that the plaintiff in Salcedo did not allege that he incurred any costs from receiv-
ing the defendant’s marketing text message. Id. 
 66 Id. at 1170–71 (citing Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct., 1540, 1549 (2016)). The plaintiff 
alleged invasion of privacy, nuisance, conversion, and trespass to chattel. Id. at 1171. 
 67 Id. at 1171 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (AM. L. INST. 1977)). Rather, 
the court found receipt of the one text message to be solitary, quick, and transient. Id. The Eleventh 
Circuit also noted that the traditional claim of intrusion upon seclusion must further involve an inva-
sion of the privacy of a person’s body or personal matters of a category distinct from any alleged 
intrusion that the plaintiff suffered in Salcedo. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B 
cmt. b).  
 68 Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 158(a), 821D). The court noted that Congress 
was seeking to prevent residential encroachments when passing the TCPA but did not analyze this 
concern because the plaintiff failed to allege any real property invasion. Id. 
 69 Id.; see Conversion, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 6 (defining “conversion” as the 
proscribed custody of another person’s property); Trespass, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 6 
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requirements, the Eleventh Circuit reversed and remanded the case to the district 
court with instructions to dismiss the complaint.70 
B. The Second, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits Apply Spokeo with an  
Opposing Conclusion to the Eleventh Circuit 
The Second and Ninth Circuits previously faced cases similar to Salcedo, 
but the plaintiffs in those cases received multiple text messages.71 In 2017, in Van 
Patten v. Vertical Fitness Group, LLC, the Ninth Circuit held that Congress, under 
the TCPA, recognized “unsolicited contact” as a concrete injury in fact.72 Without 
breaking down the elements of each traditional tort, the court found a relationship 
between the plaintiff’s harm from receiving telemarketing text messages and the 
torts of invasion of privacy, intrusion upon seclusion, and nuisance.73 The court 
concluded that unsolicited text messages inherently intrude on one’s privacy and 
solitude; therefore, they provide sufficient grounds for standing to sue.74 
Then, in 2019, in Melito v. Experian Marketing Solutions, Inc., the Second 
Circuit also focused on the harm.75 The court noted that although text messages 
                                                                                                                           
(defining “trespass to chattels” as the action of illegally constraining a person’s property, causing 
precise forcible harm). The court held that receipt of the text message was far from absolute control 
over the phone, which a conversion claim requires. Salcedo, 936 F.3d at 1171 (citing RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 222A). The court similarly found that the plaintiff’s allegation was far less 
severe than necessary for a trespass to chattel claim. Id. at 1171–72 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF TORTS §§ 217(b), 218(c) & cmt. e.). 
 70 See Salcedo, 936 F.3d at 1172–73 (concluding that neither tradition nor congressional intent 
favored a grant of standing to sue). The decision included a single concurring opinion focused on the 
fact that the plaintiff had only received one telemarketing text message from the defendant. Id. at 
1173–74 (Pryor, J., concurring). The concurring opinion stated that the majority’s decision should be 
read narrowly and leave open the question of whether standing exists in a similar situation involving 
multiple text messages. Id. at 1174.  
 71 See Melito v. Experian Mktg. Sols., Inc., 923 F.3d 85, 88 (2d Cir.) (addressing whether tele-
marking text messages concretely injure the recipient for standing purposes), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 
677 (2019); Van Patten v. Vertical Fitness Grp., Inc., 847 F.3d 1037, 1040 (9th Cir. 2017) (same); see 
also Salcedo, 936 F.3d at 1165 (majority opinion) (determining if receipt of one text message was 
enough to confer standing). The Eleventh Circuit did not discuss or cite the Second Circuit’s decision 
despite the Second Circuit issuing its decision almost four months prior to Salcedo. See generally 
Salcedo, 936 F.3d 1162 (failing to discuss the Second Circuit’s analysis of standing with respect to 
unwanted text messages). 
 72 Van Patten, 847 F.3d at 1043. Contra generally Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 
Pub. L. No. 102-243, 105 Stat. 2394, 2394–2402 (1991) (discussing unsolicited telephone calls and 
fax advertisements but never mentioning “unsolicited contact” generally). 
 73 See Van Patten, 847 F.3d at 1043 (pointing to traditional harms related to privacy concerns 
(citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B)). The court did not address the absence of text 
messages from the relevant language of the TCPA or the FCC’s later inclusion of them in TCPA regu-
lations. See id. (stating simply that the TCPA creates consumer protections from some calls and texts). 
 74 Id. Rather than focusing on the TCPA’s applicability to text messages themselves, the Ninth 
Circuit ruled that the unwanted contact from text messages presents the same type of harm that Con-
gress meant to prevent with the TCPA. Id. 
 75 See Melito, 923 F.3d at 93 (assessing the effects of unsolicited text messaging rather than the 
action itself). 
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are different than calls and faxes, the plaintiff’s injuries, namely nuisance and 
invasion of privacy, were the same injuries that the TCPA protected.76 The Sec-
ond Circuit further held that the harm suffered from receipt of unsolicited texts 
was related to the traditional torts of nuisance, invasion of privacy, and intrusion 
upon seclusion.77 Finding no additional harm necessary, the court ruled that the 
plaintiff had standing to sue.78 
In 2020, in Gadelhak v. AT&T Services, Inc., the Seventh Circuit also ad-
dressed the same standing issue.79 In response to the Salcedo court’s holding that 
a text message is less severe than traditionally required for an intrusion upon se-
clusion claim, the Seventh Circuit held that Spokeo requires a correlation in type 
rather than magnitude.80 The court followed the Second and Ninth Circuits, de-
ciding that the receipt of unwanted text messages is a concrete injury in fact that 
grants standing to sue.81 
III. THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT’S CORRECT CONCLUSION  
USING FLAWED REASONING 
The United States Courts of Appeals for the Second, Seventh, Ninth, and 
Eleventh Circuits all applied the framework that the Supreme Court of the United 
States laid out in 2016 in Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, but the Eleventh Circuit did so 
more thoroughly than the other circuits.82 Section A of this Part examines the 
                                                                                                                           
 76 See id. (noting that the plaintiff’s allegations of harm aligned with the harms that Congress 
pointed out when drafting and passing the TCPA). 
 77 Id. (citing Van Patten, 847 F.3d at 1043). The court also noted that the defendants did not dis-
pute this requirement of close relation to traditional claims. Id. 
 78 Id. at 93, 95 (citing Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1549 (2016)). The defendants 
argued that the plaintiff needed to show further injury. Id. at 93. The Second Circuit disagreed, how-
ever, stating that the defendant’s argument would only apply if the plaintiff had alleged a mere risk of 
injury. Id. at 93–94. 
 79 Gadelhak v. AT&T Servs., Inc., 950 F.3d 458, 461–63 (7th Cir. 2020). The Gadelhak court 
concentrated on the traditional intrusion upon seclusion tort, finding that the plaintiff’s harm was akin 
to that tort. Id. at 462 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (AM. L. INST. 1977)). 
 80 Id. at 462 (citing Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549); see Salcedo v. Hanna, 936 F.3d 1162, 1171 (holding 
that one unwanted text message does not rise to the level of offense needed to qualify as an offensive 
violation of one’s solitude). The Seventh Circuit then ruled that Congress was resolved to protect 
consumers from the harm that the plaintiff suffered. Gadelhak, 950 F.3d at 462. The court did not 
address the fact that Congress did not include text messaging in the TCPA. See id. (focusing on the 
harm, rather than the cause of the harm, that the plaintiff endured). 
 81 Gadelhak, 950 F.3d at 463. 
 82 See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1549 (2016) (holding that courts should examine 
Congress’s judgment and traditional legal standards to determine when an intangible alleged harm is 
concrete). Compare Salcedo v. Hanna, 936 F.3d 1162, 1168–72 (11th Cir. 2019) (applying the Spokeo 
framework, including individually analyzing the plaintiff’s alleged harm to each possibly related tradi-
tional harm), with Gadelhak v. AT&T Servs., 950 F.3d 458, 461–63 (7th Cir. 2020) (applying the 
Spokeo framework briefly, focusing only on the kind of harm, not the degree nor the cause of it), and 
Melito v. Experian Mktg. Sols., Inc., 923 F.3d 85, 92–94 (2d Cir.) (applying the Spokeo framework 
briefly and summarily), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 677 (2019), and Van Patten v. Vertical Fitness Grp., 
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courts’ applications of the first Spokeo prong: congressional judgment.83 Section 
B analyzes the courts’ applications of the second Spokeo prong: traditional harms 
based in common law history.84 
A. The Eleventh Circuit Should Have Deferred to the FCC’s Regulations 
In 2019, in Salcedo v. Hanna, the Eleventh Circuit properly focused on the 
applicability of the TCPA to text messages and any accompanying harm from 
receiving them.85 The Second, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits incorrectly focused 
merely on the general type of harm that Congress intended to protect against.86 
The Salcedo court accurately showed that Congress had not directly included text 
messages in the relevant provisions of the TCPA, noting that they only appear in 
FCC regulations.87 The court then declared that there was no reason to decide 
what level of deference to give the FCC because Spokeo points only to the judg-
ment of Congress.88 
Yet, in 1984, in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 
Inc., the Supreme Court held that, when Congress explicitly leaves issues un-
                                                                                                                           
LLC, 847 F.3d 1037, 1042–43 (9th Cir. 2017) (applying the Spokeo framework briefly as one com-
bined test rather than two separate prongs). 
 83 See infra notes 85–94 and accompanying text. 
 84 See infra notes 95–107 and accompanying text. 
 85 See Salcedo, 936 F.3d at 1169, 1170 (holding that the TCPA does not mention text messages 
and that unwanted telephone calls to home landlines have different effects on the recipient than un-
wanted text messages). The Supreme Court, in Spokeo, likely intended that a plaintiff show some 
relationship between the statute in question and the cause of the harm, not just the type of harm itself, 
thus preventing a plaintiff from meeting the injury in fact requirement solely by capitalizing on a 
statute that identifies a similar harm. See 136 S. Ct. at 1549 (stating that Congress may communicate 
new causes of harm that can prompt a case or controversy, which is helpful for courts when analyzing 
an intangible harm (citing Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 580 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concur-
ring in part and concurring in the judgment))). As such, a recipient of unwanted text messages should 
not be able to simply point to any statute related to privacy concerns. See Melito, 923 F.3d at 93 (rul-
ing that the plaintiff suffered the same type of harm as Congress meant to protect in the TCPA even 
though the cause—unwanted text messages—was different than the cause of harms identified in the 
Act—phone calls and faxes). 
 86 See Gadelhak, 950 F.3d at 462 (deciding that Congress addressed the harm from unsolicited 
telemarketing, generally, in passing the TCPA); Melito, 923 F.3d at 93 (ruling that unwanted text 
messages are the same type of nuisance and invasion of privacy as unwanted calls and faxes); Van 
Patten, 847 F.3d at 1043 (ruling that receipt of unwanted text messages was an injury in fact related to 
traditional claims because Congress enumerated it in the statute). The Second Circuit did note the 
similarity between text messages and phone calls and faxes, though it did so summarily without ex-
plicitly addressing the fact that the TCPA does not reference text messages. See Melito, 923 F.3d at 93 
(noting briefly that text messages are distinct from calls and faxes but exhibit the same broad harms of 
nuisance and invasion of privacy). 
 87 See Salcedo, 936 F.3d at 1169 (stating that the TCPA says “nothing” about text messages and 
noting that they fall under the TCPA only through FCC interpretation). The Eleventh Circuit gave 
considerable weight to the fact that Congress had not yet endorsed the FCC’s discretionary inclusion 
of text messages through any amendments to the TCPA. See id. (refusing to formulate a new harm 
without Congress’s explicit approval). 
 88 Id. at 1169 & n.8. 
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addressed in a statute for an agency to address, Congress delegates its authority to 
the agency.89 As such, the agency’s regulatory constructions are controlling for 
areas within that delegation.90 The TCPA explicitly delegates authority to the 
FCC to implement and regulate the restrictions and prohibitions in the statute.91 
Therefore, the Eleventh Circuit should not have stopped its analysis after finding 
no congressional dialogue on text messages in the TCPA.92 Rather, the Eleventh 
Circuit should have followed Chevron, giving the requisite controlling weight to 
the FCC’s decision to include text messages in the relevant TCPA prohibitions.93 
                                                                                                                           
 89 Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843–44 (1984). 
 90 Id. at 844. When congressional delegation is explicit, Courts can only ignore an agency’s con-
structions if it is unreasoned or clearly conflicts with the statute at issue. Id. 
 91 See Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) of 1991, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(2) (providing the 
metes and bounds of the FCC’s regulatory power over the TCPA’s restrictions and prohibitions on the 
use of automated telephone equipment); Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 
102-243, § 2(15), 105 Stat. 2394, 2395 (finding that the FCC should implement reasonable regulatory 
steps to restrict automated calls to homes and businesses). In 1999, in AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utilities 
Board, the Supreme Court ruled that the FCC has the power to implement and execute the terms of the 
Communications Act of 1934 and its amendments. 525 U.S. 366, 378 (1999); see 105 Stat. at 2394 
(stating that the TCPA amends the Communications Act of 1934). 
 92 See Salcedo, 936 F.3d at 1169 (ruling that Congress did not intend to include text messages in 
the TCPA and giving no weight to the FCC’s choice to make such an inclusion in the statute). 
 93 See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843–44 (requiring courts to defer to an agency’s decisions about a 
statute when Congress expressly provided that agency with the authority to make those decisions); 
2003 Order, 18 FCC Rcd. at 14,115 (ordering that calls and texts to wireless phones fall within the 
purview of the TCPA’s restrictions and prohibitions on the use of automated telephone equipment). 
But see Salcedo, 936 F.3d at 1169 (deciding that courts only owe deference to Congress, not the 
FCC). Even if Congress’s delegation of authority was not explicit concerning text messages, due to 
their non-existence at the time, a court should consider that the FCC’s authority to regulate telemar-
keting in light of new technologies is implicit. See 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(2) (giving no explicit delega-
tion to the FCC to regulate new technologies but giving the FCC broad regulatory power over the 
implementation of prohibitions on the use of automated calling); Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844 (noting 
that congressional delegation of authority to another agency is sometimes implied). There is no re-
strictive language on how the FCC may carry out its regulatory power that would negate a conclusion 
of an implicit delegation of authority to regulate emerging technologies. See 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(2) 
(stating what the FCC “shall” and “may” do, not what it shall not or may not do, to regulate the use of 
automated telephone equipment); § 2(15), 105 Stat. at 2395 (stating only what the FCC should con-
sider). In this case, the same result would occur as with an explicit delegation because the inclusion of 
text messages in the definition of phone calls in the TCPA is certainly reasonable and, thus, still con-
trolling over the courts. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844 (holding that a court cannot replace an agency’s 
reasonable reading of a statute with its own reading when Congress implicitly delegated authority to 
the agency); Salcedo, 936 F.3d at 1169 (acknowledging that the FCC has discretionary rulemaking 
authority with respect to the TCPA). In adding text messaging to the prohibitions on the use of auto-
mated telephone equipment, the FCC likely met the three aspects of reasonableness that the Supreme 
Court stated in Chevron. See 467 U.S. at 865 (ruling that an agency’s interpretation was reasonable 
due to (1) the intricate and specialized nature of the regulations at issue, (2) the agency’s logical and 
comprehensive examinations, and (3) the resolution of contradictory positions at hand in the agency’s 
adjudication); 2015 Order, 30 FCC Rcd. at 7969–71, 8016–22 (noting the prevalence of new calling 
technologies and responding to related complaints and lawsuits requesting clarification for consumers 
on the restrictions and prohibitions of the TCPA and the inclusion of text messages under the telemar-
keting prohibitions); 2003 Order, 18 FCC Rcd. at 14,017–18 (acknowledging the friction between of 
consumer complaints about disturbances and telemarketing as a valuable commercial activity for some 
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As such, the Eleventh Circuit should have ruled that Congress, through the FCC, 
intended for the harm suffered from receiving a telemarketing text message to be 
a concrete injury that establishes standing.94 
B. The Eleventh Circuit Correctly Found No “Close” Relationship to 
Traditional Claims in the Case of Only a Single Text Message 
The Supreme Court, in Spokeo, importantly stated that Congress’s declara-
tion of a new intangible harm does not necessarily make the injury concrete for 
Article III standing purposes.95 The Court held that the alleged harm must also 
have its roots in traditional common law injuries.96 The Eleventh Circuit, there-
fore, analyzed each traditional basis that the plaintiff alleged the TCPA covered.97 
Given the circumstances, the court correctly found no “close” correlation.98 
Conversely, the Ninth Circuit’s 2017 analysis in Van Patten v. Vertical Fit-
ness Group, Inc. on this part of the Spokeo framework was flawed in one key re-
spect.99 The court incorrectly combined the two Spokeo tests in deciding that a 
                                                                                                                           
businesses). The Salcedo court seemed to reason, however, that regardless of Congress’s delegation to 
the FCC, whether explicit or implicit, an assessment of reasonableness was unnecessary because Con-
gress was silent on the applicability of the prohibitions on the use of automated equipment to text 
messages. 936 F.3d at 1169. The Eleventh Circuit emphasized the fact that Congress had included text 
messaging in a different subsection of 47 U.S.C. § 227 through amendment. Id. at 1169 n.7. In Chev-
ron, however, the Supreme Court cited a lack of congressional criticism as support for the conclusion 
that Congress implicitly delegated authority over the contested issue to the agency in question. 467 
U.S. at 864. 
 94 See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843–44 (requiring courts to defer to an agency’s decisions about a 
statute when Congress expressly provided that agency with the authority to make those decisions). But 
see Salcedo, 936 F.3d at 1169 (observing no congressional intent despite FCC orders because the FCC 
is distinct from Congress). 
 95 Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1549 (2016). 
 96 See id. (noting that a relation to historical legal practice is important because the constitutional 
requirement that a federal court only hear a case or controversy is similarly rooted in historical com-
mon law). 
 97 See Salcedo, 936 F.3d at 1171–72 (referencing different sections of the Restatement (Second) 
of Torts and analyzing the elements of those sections with respect to the defendant’s alleged tort). The 
Eleventh Circuit’s analysis of traditional bases for suits in English and American courts was properly 
thorough. See id. (addressing the specific aspects of each traditional harm the plaintiff claimed and 
ruling that none of them were substantially related to the harm that the plaintiff allegedly suffered); 
see also supra notes 66–69 and accompanying text (discussing the Eleventh Circuit’s analysis of tra-
ditional harms). 
 98 See Salcedo, 936 F.3d at 1172 (finding substantial differences, in both type and intensity, be-
tween traditional torts and the plaintiff’s alleged harm); see also Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549 (mandat-
ing that courts look for a thorough and strong connection between an alleged intangible injury and a 
traditional common law harm when analyzing questions of standing to sue). 
 99 See Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549 (directing courts to look for a correlation between an alleged 
harm and customary common law harms when ruling on whether an injury is concrete); Van Patten v. 
Vertical Fitness Grp., Inc., 847 F.3d 1037, 1043 (9th Cir. 2017) (ruling that the receipt of unwanted 
text messages is the same privacy harm that Congress endeavored to prevent by enacting the TCPA, 
without addressing if that congressionally-identified privacy harm traced back to traditional standards 
of privacy invasions). 
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close relationship to traditional claims existed.100 The Ninth Circuit did not dis-
cuss the actual elements of any traditional claims, relying instead on Congress’s 
intent and a conclusory statement.101 
In 2019, in Melito v. Experian Marketing Solutions, Inc., the Second Circuit 
focused its brief analysis on intrusion upon seclusion, finding a close relation-
ship.102 Similar to the Ninth Circuit, the Second Circuit intermingled the Spokeo 
framework and relied on congressional intent to conclude that the harm was relat-
ed to the traditional meaning of intrusion upon seclusion.103 
In 2020, in Gadelhak v. AT&T Services, Inc., the Seventh Circuit also con-
cluded that the alleged harm from receiving five telemarketing texts was highly 
analogous to the traditional intrusion upon seclusion tort.104 The Seventh Circuit 
faltered, however, when it concluded, without any stated rationale, that the Su-
preme Court in Spokeo advised courts to assess the quality, rather than the magni-
tude, of the correlation between the alleged intangible harm and a traditional 
claim for standing purposes.105 Because the Court did not address this distinction 
in Spokeo, courts should look for a relationship in both quality and intensity, not 
one or the other as the Seventh Circuit did.106 As the test for a concrete injury for 
standing purposes currently exists under Spokeo, a court should treat the two 
prongs of history and congressional judgment as separate requirements that are 
jointly necessary.107 
                                                                                                                           
 100 See Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549 (stating that both congressional decisions and common law 
history are valuable tools in addressing a standing issue); Van Patten, 847 F.3d at 1042–43 (stating 
that Congress identified the presence of a privacy invasion and disturbance of solitude in telemarket-
ing situations but not ruling on whether that identification was closely related to the elements of any 
traditional claims). 
 101 See Van Patten, 847 F.3d at 1042 (holding that a close relationship existed to invasion of pri-
vacy and disturbance of solitude simply because of the “nature” of unwanted calls and text messages). 
 102 See Melito v. Experian Mktg. Sols., Inc., 923 F.3d 85, 93 (2d Cir.) (holding that the plaintiff 
showed a harm both that Congress clearly recognized and that matches traditional legal harms in char-
acter), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 677 (2019). In 2017, in Susinno v. Work Out World Inc., the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit noted, however, that only a few unsolicited contacts may 
not rise to the severity traditionally required for the tort of intrusion upon seclusion. 862 F.3d 346, 
351–52 (3d Cir. 2017) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B cmt. d (AM. L. INST. 
1977)). 
 103 See Melito, 923 F.3d at 93 (ruling that the plaintiff’s harm, which Congress emphasized in the 
TCPA, conformed, in essence, with traditional common law injuries). 
 104 Gadelhak v. AT&T Servs., 950 F.3d 458, 462 (7th Cir. 2020). 
 105 See id. (stating that the Spokeo decision directs courts to seek out a strong correlation between 
the claimed injury and claims in common law measured in character, not magnitude (citing Spokeo, 
136 S. Ct. at 1549). 
 106 Compare Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549 (instructing courts to ask if a “close relationship” exists 
but not describing how to assess that relationship), with Gadelhak, 950 F.3d at 462 (ruling that courts 
should value the relationship between the harm at issue and traditional harms in type, not in intensity). 
 107 See Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549 (pointing to both history and congressional judgment as key 
factors). The Court likely intended for lower courts to independently require both aspects, as the Court 
evidenced in its conclusion that Congress clearly intended to prevent the harm the plaintiff alleged in 
the case but that the alleged statutory violation did not necessarily harm the plaintiff. See id. at 1550 
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CONCLUSION 
In 2019, in Salcedo v. Hanna, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Eleventh Circuit created a circuit split when it held that the recipient of a text 
message that violated the TCPA did not suffer a concrete injury and thus did not 
have standing to sue in a federal court. The United States Courts of Appeals for 
the Second, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits held the opposite for recipients of similar 
text messages, ruling that plaintiffs receiving texts sent in violation of the TCPA 
were concretely injured and had standing. The Eleventh Circuit decision had a 
properly thorough analysis, but it incorrectly applied the congressional judgment 
prong of the framework that the Supreme Court of the United States dictated in 
2016, in Spokeo Inc. v. Robins. The Eleventh Circuit should have found sufficient 
congressional intent by deferring to the FCC’s statutorily-granted authority. 
Nonetheless, because the plaintiff did not actually suffer an injury closely related 
to a traditional legal harm, the Eleventh Circuit correctly remanded the case for 
dismissal. A future federal court deciding the standing of a recipient of any num-
ber of telemarketing text messages should follow the Spokeo framework as the 
Eleventh Circuit did in Salcedo. The future court should break with the Salcedo 
analysis, however, and employ the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Chevron, 
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., in 1984. Doing so will 
allow the court to properly address the level of deference owed to the FCC’s 
regulatory decisions about the TCPA. 
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(remanding the case to allow the Ninth Circuit to determine whether the alleged procedural violation 
resulted in a sufficiently concrete injury in fact); see also Peter C. Ormerod, A Private Enforcement 
Remedy for Information Misuse, 60 B.C. L. REV. 1893, 1922–23 (2019) (stating that the Spokeo deci-
sion failed to clarify Congress’s ability to identify new harms for standing purposes). 
